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 Summary 
Research and innovation policies are not formulated in a vacuum. They are shaped 
and influenced by myriad factors both internal and external to the realm of science 
and technology. In the context of a period of reflection on future support policies in 
Europe, this policy brief reviews the main drivers of change affecting the research 
and innovation landscape and their implications for EU policy. It observes that 
different drivers of change imply the need for similar sets of policy responses and 
concludes that wholesale changes are needed across a broad front, with a particular 
focus on eight distinct policy thrusts geared, inter alia, towards strengthening key 
elements of research and innovation systems, confronting major societal challenges, 
improving governance systems and enhancing international cooperation. 
 
 
Introduction 
Many factors and forces influence the ways in which research and innovation 
activities are performed and the ends to which they are directed. Dramatic events in 
natural ecosystems, for example, can stimulate the mobilisation of scientific and 
technological resources to understand, resolve and mitigate many of the problems 
associated with developments such as climate change. Similarly, instabilities in 
political ecosystems can act to reorient the research and innovation priorities of 
affected governments, and the myriad ways in which industrial structures can evolve 
across the globe can, in turn, lead to dramatic shifts in the spatial distribution and 
concentration of research and innovation actors and activities. 
 
In February 2011, the EU launched a public debate on the key issues that should be 
taken into account when formulating future EU research and innovation funding 
programmes.1 The time is ripe, therefore, for a review of some of the main drivers of 
change affecting the research and innovation landscape and their implications for EU 
policy.2 The next section thus considers a series of ‘exogenous’ drivers, i.e. 
developments in the broader social, economic and political environments in which 
research and innovation activities are located that can have profound effects upon 
these activities. Individual drivers are considered in turn, briefly noting their defining 
characteristics and outlining their specific consequences for policy. 
 
The following section considers a series of ‘endogenous’ drivers, e.g. scientific and 
technological developments that can change policy priorities, or new forms or ways of 
conducting research and innovation activities that have particular implications for 
policy formulation and implementation. 
                                            
1 European Commission (2011), ‘From Challenges to Opportunities: Towards a Common Strategic 
Framework for EU Research and Innovation Funding’, Green Paper, COM(2011) 48, Brussels, 
9.2.2011 
2  Since the purpose of this policy brief is to provide a ‘tour d’horizon’, the coverage of each driver is 
necessarily cursory. Neither should the amount of space devoted to particular drivers be taken as an 
indication of relative importance, since less coverage is given to topics that have been discussed 
extensively in policy fora and more to those that have not. 
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‘Performance’ drivers are considered in the next section. These are drivers of change 
that result from reflections on the performance of research and innovation systems 
and the policies in place to support them. In particular, assessments of performance 
weaknesses and policy deficits can stimulate new policy initiatives to rectify these 
deficiencies. 
 
Noting in particular that many drivers – endogenous, exogenous and performance-
related – can give rise to similar or common policy responses, a concluding section 
summarises the combined implications of all drivers for the overall formulation and 
implementation of EU research and innovation policy. 
Exogenous Drivers of Change 
Developments in the broader social, economic and political environments in which 
research and innovation activities are located can have profound effects upon these 
activities. Below we deal with some of the policy implications associated with 
‘exogenous’ drivers of change spanning: 
 
 The recent and on-going financial crisis; 
 Globalisation; 
 Regional disparities; 
 Demographic shifts; 
 Grand challenges; and 
 Political instability. 
Financial Crisis 
The financial crisis that has engulfed the world for the past three years has placed 
enormous constraints on the availability of the finance needed by both the public and 
private sectors to invest in research and innovation. Uncertain demand has also 
constrained investment even when capital has been to hand. The crisis has thus 
acted as a ‘negative driver’, with particularly harsh repercussions for all but the most 
affluent of countries and, in the private sector, for SMEs requiring access to external 
sources of capital. Investment in research and innovation, however, offers a viable 
recovery route for both public and private sectors, making efforts to ring-fence, 
maintain and even expand such investment a policy priority, even when there are 
strong competing claims on scarce financial resources.   
Globalisation 
The globalisation of trade has led to significant changes in the ways in which 
enterprises are structured and operate.  Even the smallest enterprises operate in 
global rather than solely local markets, and the largest multinationals – many with 
turnovers significantly greater than the GDPs of moderately-sized national economies 
– not only have sales, manufacturing and service units in a broad range of countries, 
but are also deeply embedded in value chains that span many continents. They are 
also actively relocating research laboratories and innovation centres across the globe 
in order to reap the benefits of nearness to market and cheaper sources of highly 
skilled personnel.   
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In the ICT sector, for example, MNCs with their headquarters in the EMEA region3 
still had 45% of their R&D centres located in this region in 2007/8, but 13% were 
located in the Americas region, 18% in the APAC region and 3% in the Japan.4 In 
this and other sectors, the overall spatial distribution of research and innovation 
centres is changing rapidly. On the one hand, there is a tendency for the number of 
research and innovation ‘hotspots’ in the world to rise as scientific and technological 
competences and market potential increase dramatically in countries such as the 
BRICs.5 In parallel, however, there is another tendency for the size of some 
individual ‘hotspots’ to increase as firms seek the ‘cluster’ benefits of local 
agglomerations of research and innovation actors, while other ‘ex-hotspots’ decrease 
in size as firms relocate to stronger clusters and foreign locations.  One potential 
outcome for the EU, therefore, is that some hotspots will grow stronger while the 
overall number of hotspots shrinks. 
                                           
 
The implications for EU policy are manifold. Continued increases in market potential 
and highly qualified personnel in the BRICs and elsewhere are unlikely to lessen and 
EU policy should aim to help rather than hinder EU headquartered enterprises in their 
efforts to realise this market potential.  At the same time, in order to avoid a net 
outflow of research and innovative capacity from the EU, considerable efforts will be 
needed firstly to entice EU headquartered firms to retain some research and 
innovation capacity in the EU, and secondly to attract non-EU headquartered firms to 
invest in the EU, particularly in terms of building up their EU-based research and 
innovation capacity. Policy efforts, therefore, should focus both on the market side – 
facilitating reciprocal access to open markets across the globe – and on the supply 
side, via efforts to improve the performance and well-being of the most dynamic local 
concentrations or clusters of research and innovation actors and activities in the EU, 
thus making them magnets for footloose foreign investment.    
Regional Disparities 
In the long-term, the globalisation of trade only makes sense if market potential can 
be both created and satisfied, which is complicated and confounded by the existence 
and growth of socio-economic divides and regional disparities that put huge 
constraints on market development.  In the short-term, though, the frequently chaotic, 
heterogeneous evolution of globalised patterns of trade, production and creative 
activity can create imbalances and divides that demand policy attention if they are not 
to become permanent features of the socio-economic landscape. The emergence of 
strong clusters in some regions at the expense of a corresponding decline in the 
number and strength of clusters in other regions, for example, is one possibility that 
could lead, eventually, to a divide between ‘innovation-rich’ and ‘innovation-poor’ 
regions. 
 
 
 
3  EMEA = Europe Russia, the Middle-East to the India border, and Africa; Americas = North, South 
and Central America and the Caribbean countries; APAC = India, Southeast Asia, China, South 
Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean 
countries. 
4  These figures are based on the JRC-IPTS ICT R&D Location Database covering 1,800 sites belong 
to 80 MNCs considered to be major semiconductor influencers. See IPTS (2010), ‘The 2010 Report on 
R&D in ICT in the European Union’, JRC Scientific and Technical Report. 
5  BRICs = Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
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Policy solutions to this dilemma could involve distributive welfare policies, but there is 
also ample scope for ‘smart specialisation’ strategies in terms of the development of 
regional research and innovation capabilities. The logic of cluster development 
argues for the heterogeneous concentration of activities in a limited number of 
regions and against the development of homogenous ‘look alike’ competence profiles 
in all regions. There is considerable potential, however, for clusters differentiated 
along thematic or sectoral lines to be distributed across multiple regions in such a 
way that all regions have distinctive but different competence profiles. 
Demographic Shifts 
Building up research and innovation capabilities demands a heavy investment in the 
education and training of highly skilled and qualified personnel, but success depends 
not only on the quality of educational infrastructures and the calibre of educational 
service provision, but also on the existence of adequate stocks of human capital. 
Increasingly over the next forty years, however, the EU is likely to be on the wrong 
side of a demographic divide that is emerging between different country blocs.6  In 
some countries, e.g. India and Brazil, population profiles are becoming increasingly 
youthful, with the potential size of workforces expected to grow. In contrast, in the 
EU, as in Japan and, to a lesser extent, the USA, there is an ageing population 
profile, with the workforce as a proportion of the total population set to shrink. 
Combined with the fact that interest in science subjects is on the decline amongst EU 
school students, this means that the stocks of human capital needed to fuel 
innovation-led growth are likely to be constrained in Europe. 
 
The inescapable onset of an ageing society poses many policy problems, not least of 
which is how to ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to the production of 
innovative responses to changing healthcare and social welfare needs. In terms of 
tackling potential human capital deficiencies, however, there is an urgent need for 
actions designed to increase interest in science subjects amongst the school 
population and to promote the concept of ‘continual learning’ amongst older cohorts. 
Another imperative will be to step-up efforts to improve the inward mobility of 
qualified personnel and foreign students, though an even more prescient approach 
would be to encourage ‘brain circulation’ strategies with developing countries on the 
other side of the demographic divide, accompanying these efforts with other forms of 
assistance designed to strengthen the research and innovation infrastructures of 
selected partner countries and forge strong, mutually beneficial links with their 
fledgling research and innovation communities. 
Grand Challenges 
Coping with an ageing population is just one amongst many of the ‘Grand 
Challenges’ confronting the EU, so-called because of the scale or urgency of the 
disruptive threat they pose to society.  The length of any list of such challenges will 
always be contentious, but there can be no doubt about the inclusion in such lists of 
topics like climate change, potential energy and natural resource shortages and 
affordable healthcare – all of which have global as well as EU dimensions. 
 
                                            
6  Archibugi et al (2008), ‘Opening to the World: International Cooperation in Science and Technology’, 
Report of the ERA Expert Group to DG Research 
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There is also no doubt that research and innovation have an important part to play in 
both helping to dimension all of these threats and in combating them. The policy 
dilemma is how to mobilise sufficient resources in a timely fashion appropriate to the 
scale and urgency of the threats they pose. This will involve a greater emphasis on 
‘targeted’ research and innovation agendas focused on specific socio-economic 
problem areas; and it will involve a sea change in the cross-border pooling of national 
resources dedicated to these ends, since no single country could hope or afford to 
tackle them alone. Also, because of the global nature of most ‘Grand Challenges’, 
levels of coordination and collaboration will necessarily have to extend far beyond the 
boundaries of the EU. The greatest policy challenge, however, will be to effect all 
these changes within exceptionally short time-scales – something that will be 
exceedingly difficult to do without political commitment at the highest levels and a 
broad consensus concerning the necessity for radical action amongst all relevant 
stakeholders. 
Political Instability 
Political instability within individual countries affects economic growth and the 
investment climate. Much of the literature suggests that radical political change 
(revolutions, coups, assassinations etc.) has strongly negative impacts on growth.7 
Alesina et al (1992; 1995),8 for example, analysed this relationship in a sample of 
113 countries over the period 1950-82. They noted that growth was significantly 
lower in countries and time periods where there was a high propensity for 
governments to collapse. Conversely, more recent work by Bellettini et al (2009),9 
which studied incremental political changes (e.g. changes of government as a result 
of democratic elections) in a sample of 56 democratic countries over the period 1975-
2004, has demonstrated that there is a negative association between political stability 
and economic growth in countries with high bureaucratic costs and onerous 
regulatory burdens. This led the authors to postulate that political contacts with long-
term political elites were being exploited by low-quality producers to reduce or evade 
regulatory burdens, defend monopoly positions and prevent innovation and the entry 
of high-quality competitors. Efforts to stimulate innovation by reducing such burdens 
thus have much to recommend them. 
 
Political tensions between countries and terrorist threats also have an obvious impact 
on political stability and numerous implications for the practice and governance of 
research and innovation. Heightened tensions, for example, increase the demand for 
scarce resources to be allocated towards defence and security needs, leading to 
number of scenarios for the governance of research and innovation. One 
                                            
7  See a survey of the literature by Carmignani, F. (2003), ‘Political instability, uncertainty and 
economics’, Journal of Economic Surveys, 17, 1-54.  Also see World Bank (2011), ‘Conflict, Security 
and Development’, World Development Report 2011 
8  Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N. and Swagel, P. (1992), ‘Political instability and economic growth’, 
NBER Working Paper 4173, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA; Alesina, A., Özler, S., Roubini, N. and 
Swagel, P. (1995), ‘Political Instability and Economic Growth’, Journal of Economic Growth, 1, 189-
211 
9  Bellettini, G., Ceroni, C. B. and Prarolo, G. (2009), Political persistence, connections and economic 
growth, CESIFO Working Paper No. 2553, Category 5: Fiscal policy, macroeconomic and growth, 
February 2009 
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contemporary study outlines four such scenarios covering developments in the EU 
(see Exhibit 1).10 
 
Essentially the options range from a status quo or ‘Indifference’ option at one 
extreme, where there is hardly any interaction between civil and defence research, 
between research and innovation policies, and between national and EU wide policy 
efforts, to a more fully coordinated ‘Integration’ scenario at the other end of the 
spectrum, where there is close cooperation between civil and defence research 
efforts, demand-led policies that link research and innovation, and extensive 
alignment of national and EU defence research policies. In between there are 
‘Competition’ and ‘Cooperation’ scenarios that vary along some but not all of these 
dimensions. 
 
As political tensions and terrorist threats increase, the indifference option becomes 
both unlikely and unwise. The need to reap synergies between civil and defence 
research, the need to link research and innovation effectively, and the need to pool 
resources in order to gain economies of scale are all likely to increase the pressure 
on policymakers to adopt more coordinated and coherent policy responses. 
 
 
Exhibit 1 – Four Scenarios for Interactions between ERA and Security and 
Defence Research and Innovation Policy 
 
 
Source: Sandera Project. See www.sandera.net.  
 
In the longer term, however, the changing nature of security threats may place huge 
constraints on the ability of governments to evolve coherent policy responses. Wittes 
(2010)11 argues that scientific and technological developments in fields such as 
                                            
10  The results of the Sandera project (see www.sandera.net) are due to be presented in Brussels at 
the Final Project Conference on 10 May 2011. 
11 Wittes, B. (2010), ‘Innovation’s darker future: biosecurity, technologies of mass empowerment, and 
the constitution’, Governance Studies at Brookings, December 08, 2010 
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biotechnology are increasingly putting enormous destructive power into the hands of 
individuals and small groups, with significant repercussions for the governance of 
research and innovation and for the relationship between the state and individuals. 
“The issue will not simply be managing the threat of biological terrorism or biosecurity 
more broadly. It will be defining a relationship between the state and individuals with 
respect to the use and development of such dramatically empowering technologies 
that permits the state to protect security and at once insists that it does so without 
becoming repressive”. 
 
Heavy-handed attempts to monitor and control scientific developments could stifle 
creativity and limit benign as well as deleterious impacts, but Wittes argues that 
attempts to close Pandora’s Box are already too late. Instead, “the continued 
proliferation of these technologies will almost certainly precipitate a significant 
erosion of the federal government’s monopoly over security policy. It will tend to 
distribute responsibility for security to thousands of private sector and university 
actors whom the technology empowers every bit as much as it does would-be 
terrorists and criminals”. The policy imperative, therefore, is to anticipate the need for 
constitutional change and explore the viability of all acceptable options. 
Endogenous Drivers of Change 
Scientific and technological developments can change policy priorities and often 
create the need for new policy interventions. Similarly, new ways of performing 
research or novel forms of innovation can have particular consequences for policy 
formulation and implementation. This section discusses some of the policy 
implications associated with the following ‘endogenous’ drivers of change: 
 
 New scientific and technological (S&T) opportunities; 
 ICT developments; and 
 New forms of innovation. 
New S&T Opportunities 
There are strong aesthetic, cultural and educational reasons for undertaking scientific 
research, all related to our need to understand the way in which the world works. But 
there is also strong evidence that research and innovation are linked in complex 
ways with social and economic benefits,12 and these potential benefits are becoming 
increasingly important justifications for the public and private sector funding of 
research and innovation. 
 
This is not an argument, however, for dedicating all research funding to research 
specifically geared to the production of social and economic benefits. Certainly there 
is a need to focus increasing amounts on potential solutions to ‘Grand Challenges’ 
(see earlier), but history is also full of examples of ‘blue-sky’ or ‘frontier’ research 
initiatives that have opened up new scientific and technological opportunities with 
momentous consequences for downstream social and economic impacts, many of 
which could not have been predicted at the outset. Such research is thus an 
important trigger for the reorientation of future research activities.  
                                            
12  This evidence is summarised in the Commission Staff Working Document that accompanied the 
EU’s Innovation Union Communication – European Commission (2010), ‘A Rationale for Action’, 
SEC(2010) 1161 final. 
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This is why an evolving, dynamic balance exists between funding for ‘basic’ and 
‘applied’, or ‘blue-sky’ and ‘mission-oriented’ research, with the balance shifting 
towards the ‘directed’ end of the spectrum as the importance of directing research 
towards the solution of major societal problems is realised, but with safeguards and 
ring-fencing in place to ensure that there is always room for ‘open-ended’ research 
efforts. 
 
At EU level, national funding for ‘open-ended’ research has been complemented 
since 2007 by European Research Council (ERC) funding for investigator-driven 
‘frontier’ research, where scientific excellence is the sole criterion for selection. The 
rationale for this is predicated upon the assumption that EU-wide competitions based 
on excellence will eventually improve overall excellence levels in Europe by: 
 
 Allowing excellent researchers to complement national funding that is limited, in 
some settings, by resource constraints; 
 Attracting excellent researchers outside the EU to relocate to the EU; 
 Ensuring that excellence is rewarded whatever the location of the research, thus 
allowing excellence adjudged at EU level to function as a benchmark for the 
rewarding of excellence in national settings. 
 
Continued support at EU level for the ERC should depend on the attainment of EU 
added value, namely evidence that excellence levels are truly being raised. This will 
take time, but already there are promising signs. A forthcoming review of early 
impacts13 suggests that scientists of the highest calibre are applying for and winning 
ERC grants; that papers resulting from ERC projects are being published in 
prestigious scientific journals; that some of the findings of ERC projects are being 
hailed as exceptional or landmark advances; and that some researchers outside the 
EU have been attracted by EU funding. Critically, the results of ERC selection 
procedures have also been used as the basis for national funding decisions, which 
could lead in future to a convergence of quality standards. 
 
It is still early days, and definitive proof that EU level competitive funding schemes for 
‘frontier’ research will truly complement national endeavours has not yet been 
amassed, but all the initial signs suggest that continuation of the ERC policy 
experiment should be strongly supported. 
ICT Developments 
Developments in science and technology can and do shape the future practice of 
research and innovation. The impact of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) over the last half century on the conduct of scientific research 
provides ample evidence for this, and contemporary developments in ICT are likely to 
have as great or even greater impacts in the future on both research and innovation. 
 
Burgelman et al (2010)14 highlight three trends that are likely to have significant – if 
unpredictable – impacts not only on the practice of research and innovation but also 
                                            
13  ERC (2011), ‘Early Impacts of Wide-Ranging Impact of the IDEAS Programme (ERC)’, forthcoming 
14  Burgelman, J-C., Osimo, D. and Bogdanowicz, M. (2010), ‘Science 2.0 (change will happen…)’, 
First Monday, Volume 15, No. 7, 5 July 2010 
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on the epistemological status of scientific knowledge. The first trend concerns the 
huge growth in the number of authors that has been facilitated by increasing levels of 
literacy and the myriad different ways in which ICT allows authors to communicate 
with disparate audiences (e.g. via the use of blogs and other social networking 
vehicles). Although a general trend, it is also likely to impact on the world of science, 
blurring the distinction between amateur and professional researchers and the 
numbers claiming that their work has scientific status. 
 
The second trend concerns the increasing tendency of scientists to publish results, 
drafts and progress reports in non-traditional outlets. Informal communications 
between individual scientists of this nature are certainly not new, but the extent and 
openness of such interactions are recent developments that have given rise to terms 
such as ‘open science’ or ‘liquid science’. This has the potential to improve 
knowledge sharing and collective scientific performance, but it could also undermine 
the role of conventional scientific publication as the main quality control mechanism 
in the world of science, with related implications for scientific reward systems and 
career development.  
There are also potential repercussions for innovation given that the attribution and 
allocation of intellectual property rights (IPR) could become increasingly complex and 
disputed, with deleterious impacts on the incentive to innovate. 
 
The growth in data availability and processing capacity is the third trend. Not only 
does this allow increasing numbers of ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ scientists to 
analyse unprecedented amounts of data using increasingly sophisticated and 
generally available tools, it could also lead to increased acceptance of the notion that 
correlation could supersede causation as the bedrock of science, with science 
advancing “without coherent models, unified theories, or really any mechanistic 
explanation at all”.15 
 
The exact form that ICT developments will have on the practice of research and 
innovation are by no means clear. There is little doubt, however, that they are likely to 
have dramatic impacts on the way we understand and classify scientific activity; on 
the filter and control mechanisms that have to be in place to assess and assure 
scientific quality; on the institutional mechanisms needed to assess and reward 
scientific performance; and on the shape and form of appropriate IPR regimes. A 
policy priority, therefore, is to anticipate these impacts and evolve coping strategies. 
New Forms of Innovation 
Simple models of innovation often involve single manufacturing firms conducting their 
own research before exploiting the results of this research to produce and market 
new product, process and service innovations. In reality, however, although this 
simple model continues to characterise one aspect of the behaviour of some firms, 
actual practices are much more varied and complex. Interdependencies have long 
existed, for example, between public sector research organisations and private sector 
research and innovation actors, and the increasing extent of private-private 
knowledge-related interactions has highlighted the phenomenon of ‘open innovation’, 
whereby companies rely much more than hitherto on globally-traded knowledge 
                                            
15  Anderson, C. (2007), ‘The end of theory: the data deluge makes the scientific method obsolete’, 
Wired, Volume 16, No. 7 
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inputs and outputs as well as on self-generated knowledge.  Similarly, the growing 
tendency to involve users in the co-creation of value has led to use of the term ‘user-
driven’ innovation. It also clear that a considerable amount of innovation does not 
draw directly upon the fruits of research or even on the introduction of new 
technology. Examples include organisational reforms that alter modes of production, 
the introduction of new, innovative business models and new models of service 
provision. The latter example highlights the fact that much innovation occurs in a 
broad range of service sectors, which nowadays dominate the sectoral profiles of 
most modern economies. Mention also has to be made of ‘social innovation’, a term 
that captures the fact that the public sector has to innovate in order to introduce new 
and better forms of public service provision. 
 
This complex reality constitutes a driver for new policy responses simply because the 
majority of conventional innovation policies have tended to be underpinned by the 
simple model of a single manufacturing firm exploiting the results of its own research.  
The policy priority, therefore, is to evolve richer sets of policy instruments that are 
customised to serve the needs of different forms of innovation.  
For ‘open innovation’, for example, the need is to remove barriers to the free flow of 
knowledge between different actors within IPR regimes that remain fair, equitable 
and acceptable to all interested parties. In contrast, for innovation in the service 
sector and ‘social innovation’, the policy priority is to create support instruments that 
have, to date, been conspicuous by their absence. 
 
Performance Drivers of Change 
 
‘Performance’ drivers are drivers of change that result from reflections on the 
performance of research and innovation systems and the policies in place to support 
them. Assessments of performance can reveal structural weaknesses that call for 
new policies to rectify them, while considered assessments of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the policies and policy instruments used to support research and 
innovation can reveal policy deficits that merit attention. Correspondingly, this section 
deals with: 
 
 Weaknesses in the performance of research and innovation systems; and 
 Policy deficits. 
Performance Weaknesses 
Policy responses are driven not only by exogenous events or changes endogenous 
to the research and innovation system that present new opportunities, but also by 
reflective assessments of historical performance and the ability of the system to 
attain new policy goals. 
 
Even a cursory review of the performance of the EU research and innovation 
system16 highlights three main weaknesses that deserve policy responses aimed at 
rectifying them. The first concerns underinvestment in research and innovation 
activities by both the public and private sectors. Compared to its main trading 
                                            
16  See, for example, the Commission Staff Working Document that accompanied the EU’s Innovation 
Union Communication – European Commission (2010), ‘A Rationale for Action’, SEC(2010) 1161 final. 
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partners, for example, both overall R&D intensity levels and business R&D intensity 
levels are lower in the EU. 
 
The second (and presumably related) issue is the comparative strength and 
composition of the science base. Expenditure on higher education as a percentage of 
GDP is much higher in the US than in the EU and the US leads in terms of various 
aspects of research publication performance.  There are also twice as many US 
universities amongst the top 100 universities in the world, with a far greater 
concentration of top researchers in a limited number of major universities than is the 
case in Europe, where the research community tends to be more widely dispersed. 
 
Thirdly, innovation performance also lags behind both the US and Japan, whilst the 
current lead over countries such as China is diminishing rapidly. Innovation 
performance is not commensurate with expenditure on research, suggesting that 
there is scope for the greater exploitation of research results in the EU – at least for 
innovation dependent on R&D inputs. 
 
The main thrusts of appropriate policy responses are thus clear. As noted earlier in 
the section on responses to the financial crisis, current investment levels in research 
and innovation need to be maintained or increased. Secondly, concerted efforts are 
needed to bolster the science base via policies designed, for example, to improve 
research infrastructures and the employment conditions of researchers; to promote 
the modernisation of EU universities; to promote research excellence; and to 
rationalise and simplify the rules and procedures associated with the competitive 
funding of research. 
 
A third key policy response is to design and implement instruments aimed at 
removing all obstacles preventing innovative ideas reaching the market.  This will 
involve improving access to the finance that innovative companies need at both the 
early stage of the innovation cycle and subsequently during periods of rapid growth. 
It will also involve efforts designed to stimulate the creation of new markets and the 
framework conditions that will allow these to flourish. In turn, this will involve a focus 
on better knowledge protection; improved knowledge flows; improved standards 
formulation processes; regulatory reforms designed to encourage innovation and 
reduce administrative burdens; and the introduction and widespread diffusion of 
innovation-friendly procurement policies. 
Policy Deficits 
Deficits in the ability of existing research and innovation policies to effect desired 
changes in system performance can also act as a driver for change. Within the EU, at 
different levels of governance, i.e. at EU, national and regional levels, there are two 
distinct policy deficits.  The first concerns the balance between different policy 
instruments; the second concerns the coherence of different policy efforts and their 
overall governance. 
 
Concerning the balance between instruments, there has been an historical emphasis 
on supply-side support mechanisms, with very few instruments designed to stimulate 
demand.  This situation has started to change at EU level and within a select number 
of Member States, but overall the imbalance is still marked.  Weak links between 
research inputs, innovation outputs and market success, however, suggest the need 
 12 
for ‘market pull’ strategies to complement existing ‘supply push’ strategies. In 
particular, there is tremendous scope for innovation-friendly procurement strategies 
to catalyse the growth of new markets. 
 
Concerning coherence and governance deficits, these manifest themselves at a 
number of different levels and in a variety of ways. In many contexts – EU, national 
and regional – there is ample evidence of ‘silo’ thinking in terms of both the 
formulation and implementation of policies, with correspondingly little evidence of 
‘joined-up’ thinking linking policies concerned with the development of human 
resources, nurturing the science base, supporting innovation and stimulating market 
demand. There is also a problem of coherence between the policy efforts of 
individual Member States and between Member States and policy initiatives launched 
at the level of the EU. Quite naturally, the policies of individual Member States are 
explicitly designed to meet national needs, but in many instances these needs are 
shared by a number of countries and coherent, coordinated efforts that reduced 
fragmentation would be in the collective good.  
Expanding the horizon even further, the global nature of many of the challenges 
confronting individual countries calls for greater efforts to coordinate joint research 
and innovation-related activities between EU and non-EU members. 
 
At all levels, the problem of silo thinking calls for improved governance structures 
involving better communication and coordination channels between the various arms 
of government involved in or touched by research and innovation policy. There is also 
scope for a new approach to the governance of EU and Member State relationships. 
Progress in stimulating joint activities and greater coherence between Member State 
and EU policy initiatives has been made within the context of the ‘Open Method of 
Coordination’, a ‘soft governance’ approach that has involved the European 
Commission playing the role of catalyst and facilitator. Progress could be 
accelerated, however, by the adoption of a stronger form of governance involving the 
establishment of an agreed regulatory framework covering the introduction of 
measures designed not only to stimulate new joint activities, but also to remove many 
of the obstacles that currently limit the extent of cross-border cooperation. 
Policy Conclusions 
Policy Drivers and Policy Thrusts 
This review of policy drivers and their implications for policy identifies a number of 
cases where different drivers – exogenous, endogenous and performance-related – 
imply common or similar policy responses, which in turn suggests that well-designed 
policy mixes focused on key policy thrusts can be used to counter multiple threats. 
Exhibit 2 indicates in a schematic fashion the relevance of individual drivers to the 
main policy thrusts suggested by the analysis, all of which are summarised below. 
 
Strengthening the science base 
Not all innovation springs directly from research, but a considerable amount does and 
continual efforts are required to renew the knowledge base upon which intellectual 
and economic growth depends. Strong drivers include the need to ring-fence 
research from the effects of the financial crisis; the need to improve the performance 
of the science base and make the EU a magnet for skilled resources and foreign 
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investment in research and innovation; and the ever present need to maintain an 
environment that can generate radical new ideas and opportunities.  
 
Improving innovation performance 
Policies designed to improve competitiveness via corresponding improvements in 
innovation performance are needed as a direct response to the exogenous driver of 
globalisation and the urgent need to rectify overall performance weaknesses in the 
EU research and innovation system. ‘Smart’ policy mixes and governance structures 
that ensure good linkages between policies affecting the science base and market 
development are also needed, as are support mechanisms for ‘new’ forms of 
innovation. 
 
Spreading the benefits 
The forces of globalisation and the benefits that can be reaped from local 
agglomerations or clusters of research and innovation actors place new demands on 
cohesion policy within the EU. The absence of policies could lead to marked 
imbalances between ‘innovation-rich’ and ‘innovation-poor’ regions, but inappropriate 
policies could lead all regions to attempt to develop similar types of cluster. The 
alternative is ‘smart specialisation’ policies, though the development of these will 
involve enhanced levels of coordination across the EU. 
 
Expanding policy coverage 
Increased recognition of the importance of ‘non-technological’ and other forms of 
innovation, e.g. ‘social innovation’, dictates the need to expand existing concepts of 
policy coverage. The dominant position occupied by service sectors and the 
contribution they make to economic well-being also makes a focus on policies 
designed to stimulate innovation within them particularly important, particularly 
policies promoting the use of ICT to generate new forms of service delivery and 
innovative business models. 
 
Focusing on Grand Challenges 
‘Grand Challenges’ demand urgent policy responses that focus and mobilise 
resources to combat the threats they pose. Rather than diverting resources away 
from the policy thrusts needed to respond to other policy drivers, however, every 
attempt should be made to evolve policies that ‘kill two birds with one stone’. Given 
the market potential of many of the innovations needed to deal effectively with ‘Grand 
Challenges’, efforts to improve overall competitiveness and rectify performance and 
governance weaknesses should prioritise these areas. 
 
Pooling resources 
Current levels of fragmentation and duplication of policy effort are strong drivers for 
the pooling of resources. So too is the need for collective responses to ‘Grand 
Challenges’, though many obstacles to cross-border collaboration need to be 
removed before resources in the EU can be effectively mustered to remedy overall 
performance weaknesses.  
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2   The Relevance of Policy Drivers to Policy Thrusts 
 
Policy Drivers 
Exogenous Drivers Endogenous Drivers Performance Drivers Policy 
Thrusts Financial 
Crisis 
Globalisation Regional 
Disparities
Demographic 
Shifts 
Grand 
Challenges
Political 
Instability
New S&T 
Opportunities
ICT 
Developments
New 
Forms of 
Innovation
Performance 
Weaknesses 
Policy 
Deficits 
Strengthening 
the science 
base 
           
Improving 
innovation 
performance 
           
Spreading the 
benefits 
           
Expanding 
policy 
coverage 
           
Focusing on 
Grand 
Challenges 
           
Pooling 
resources 
           
International 
cooperation 
           
Improved 
policy mixes 
and 
governance 
           
Increasing relevance of policy drivers to policy thrusts         
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International cooperation 
Globalisation and demographic shifts both call for enhanced levels of international 
cooperation that seek to improve market access and improve knowledge flows, while 
confronting ‘Grand Challenges’ successfully will necessarily involve partnerships across 
the globe and the evolution of new governance structures for such alliances. 
 
Improved policy mixes and governance 
Driven primarily by existing weaknesses in modes of governance and the formulation of 
effective policy portfolios, there is an obvious need for the EU to both improve its own 
practices and to catalyse and facilitate similar improvements at Member State and even 
regional levels. The need to constitute effective responses to the ‘Grand Challenges’ will 
also necessitate the evolution of new forms of governance. 
Policy Imperatives 
Considering all the drivers of change and the range of policy thrusts they suggest, it is 
obvious that concurrent actions need to be taken across a broad front. Implementing 
just one or two policy thrusts will be insufficient, since this would constitute an inadequate 
response to at least some of the drivers. 
 
However, with so many disparate drivers and related policy thrusts, it will be essential to 
find ‘smart’ ways of combining multiple policy thrusts in coherent policy packages that 
respond effectively to multiple drivers. The aim should be to find ‘win-win’ solutions, 
whereby policy responses to some drivers also constitute effective responses to others. 
The potential of markets associated with many of the innovations that will be needed in the 
‘Grand Challenge’ areas, for example, suggests that focusing efforts to improve innovation 
performance and competitiveness (as responses to the ‘Globalisation’ and ‘Performance 
Weakness’ drivers) in these areas could lead to win-win scenarios. 
 
The scale of the threats posed by many of the drivers and the short time-scales available 
to mount adequate responses to them also highlight the urgency associated with the 
situation. Political commitment at the highest possible levels will be needed to ensure that 
key stakeholders across the EU can mobilise resources quickly and effectively. 
 
Efforts at EU level to stimulate international science and technology cooperation have a 
long history, though these have been peripheral to mainstream efforts to consolidate and 
strengthen research and innovation more directly within the EU. The relevance of 
enhanced international cooperation as part of the response to many of the drivers of 
change, however, calls for international cooperation to occupy a more central 
position on the research and innovation policy stage in the EU. 
 
To summarise, key policy imperatives are: 
 
 To act concurrently on many fronts; 
 To turn the threats presented by Grand Challenges into opportunities for 
sustainable growth; 
 To appreciate the urgency of the situation and commit to the speedy 
mobilisation of resources; 
 To shift international cooperation to the centre stage of EU research and 
innovation policy. 
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